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Federalism generates many of the seminal debates of American 
politics and law. Two recurrent premises underlie these debates: first, 
that federal governance means centralized governance, and, second, 
that decentralization means empowering state or local governments. 
From those premises flows a series of plusses and minuses of federal 
power. On the plus side, the federal government can minimize 
interstate externalities, establish nationally consistent regulatory 
programs, and draw on greater expertise and institutional economies 
of scale. On the minus side, the federal government is less likely to 
take innovative approaches or understand or respond to local 
conditions, while states and municipalities are the classic 
“laboratories of democracy” where experimentation reigns and local 
preferences receive more nuanced understanding and response. 
This conventional wisdom is undermined by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers’s implementation of section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act, which regulates the filling of “waters of the United 
States.”2 An investigation of the 404 program leads to several key 
conclusions. First, it demonstrates that federal governance 
sometimes is quite decentralized. Second, it shows that regional 
federal offices can provide many of the benefits—and some of the 
problems—that federalism rhetoric traditionally associates with state 
and local governments. Third, it shows that regional federal offices 
often interact symbiotically with states, thus helping our federalist 
system succeed. Fourth, and finally, it reveals the need for more 
inquiry into the intersections between regional offices and 
administrative law. 
 
The Structure and Approach of the Army Corps 
 
The Army Corps’s regulatory branch holds primary 
responsibility for implementing section 404 of the Clean Water Act. 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Dave Owen, Regional Federal 
Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016). 
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
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Other than the roughly eight Corps regulatory staff members who 
work full-time in Washington, D.C., regulatory-program staff 
members are dispersed among eight division offices, thirty-eight 
“district” offices, and many field offices across the country. Some of 
those field offices are heavily staffed, while other offices are simply 
individual employees working out of their homes. Decisions about 
office placement are themselves partly decentralized. Subject to the 
D.C. office’s budgetary control, district commanders may choose 
whether and where to open field offices and how to staff them. 
This geographic dispersion affects agency operations in several 
ways, one of which is to facilitate decentralization of 
communications and professional relationships. State agency 
partners, for example, will generally work with Corps offices in, or at 
least close to, their own state. Similarly, people seeking (or 
opposing) permits from the Corps will generally work with a Corps 
office close to their activities. Often, they will be talking to a Corps 
staffer who has worked for years in that particular geographic area. 
Those geographic connections and familiarities lead to close 
understanding of local culture and priorities and to an empathy for 
the people and their concerns. According to one district chief, this 
continuity of closeness could lead to more sensitivity to local needs 
than comparable state bureaucracies. 
This geographic dispersion of staff and authority has 
consequences for both the objects and beneficiaries of the Corps’s 
regulatory program. The agency routinely adjusts its regulatory 
program to local conditions, much like a judge applying national law 
to a geographically distinct set of facts. And it also adjusts the law 
itself by allowing, and sometimes encouraging, regional variation in 
regulatory approaches. 
For example, the Corps takes a region-influenced approach to 
deciding which aquatic features are subject to federal regulatory 
oversight. It has developed, upon a recommendation from the 
National Academy of Sciences, regional supplements to the national 
wetland delineation handbook. The supplements do not change the 
law but instead allow the Corps to apply a consistent set of principles 
to distinctive regional facts.3 
                                                 
3. See, e.g., U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, REGIONAL SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS WETLAND DELINEATION MANUAL: ATLANTIC 
AND GULF COASTAL PLAIN REGION (VERSION 2.0) 1 (2010). 
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The Army Corps also makes regional adjustments to the tens of 
thousands of permits it issues each year. Tailoring occurs with all 
permits, but the most readily apparent example involves general 
permits, which established standardized permitting requirements for 
large classes of similar projects. Even nationwide general permits are 
written by teams of regional staffers (though the teams also include a 
leader from the D.C. office), and those teams receive substantial 
feedback from other field-office staff. Once the permits are 
completed, individual districts can add “regional conditions” to the 
nationwide permits. Regional tailoring has become so prevalent that 
some regulated entities complain that there is too much of it. 
These regionalized permitting processes also authorize 
substantial and consequential involvement from states. Section 401 
allows states to veto or condition federal “discharge” permits, and 
this authority extends to general permits as well. States often use 
their section 401 authority to negotiate state-specific changes to 
nationwide permits and sometimes have used it to reject nationwide 
permits that the state deems insufficiently protective. That legal 
leverage, along with the Corps’s desire to expedite regulatory 
processes, leads to significant state input. In addition, district offices 
also work with some states to develop “state programmatic general 
permits.” These are state-specific federal permits, sometimes 
managed and issued by state offices, designed to simultaneously 
fulfill federal and state permitting requirements.4 
 
Some Implications of Federal Decentralization 
 
This federal decentralization, and productive federal-state 
cooperation, upends traditional federalism debates. Current 
federalism doctrine proceeds on the premise that federal governance 
represents non-local governance. That premise is wrong, at least in 
the specific context of the Army Corps. Additionally, regional offices 
have important implications for the many spheres in which 
regulatory roles overlap and power is shared. In these realms, 
regional federal offices play a key—albeit unappreciated—role in 
helping a federalist system succeed. 
                                                 
4. See, e.g., Philadelphia Dist., Marine Design Center, State 
Programmatic General Permits, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, http://www. 
nap.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/Permits/SPGP.aspx. 
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Conventional federalist thought has not explained how officials 
from a variety of different federal, state, and local agencies will 
actually go about talking through their agreements and differences. 
Will they use phone calls, emails, or in-person meetings? If they will 
talk face to face, where will they meet, and who will be in the room? 
These may sound like mundane questions, but they are crucially 
important. Coordination within complex regulatory terrains can 
succeed or go very badly, and communication systems help 
determine when cooperation thrives, and whether conflicts produce 
constructive outcomes or spiral out of control.5 
Regional federal offices make that kind of communication 
possible. Sometimes they provide a physical space where federalism 
can be sorted out, in person, across a conference table—or over a 
cubicle wall. Sometimes they provide a base from which federal 
officials can reach their meeting locations or field sites with just a 
short drive. They also let federal and state regulators get to know 
each other, and the resulting familiarity can build trust and social 
capital. That won’t always happen, of course, but for many Corps 
staff, talking with other state agencies, local governments, and 
regional offices from other federal agencies is a daily responsibility. 





Justice Brandeis once referred to the states as “laboratories of 
democracy.” That description, though accurate, is underinclusive. 
Some of the most effective laboratories may be conference tables 
surrounded by staff from local and state governments and federal 
regional offices. By making those meetings possible and meaningful, 
regional federal offices can serve as the vectors of functional 
federalism. 
 
                                                 
5. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared 
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1147–48, 1150–51 (2012). 
